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Charles IV ’s commercial policy towards the port of V eracruz is well 
known. Indeed, historians interested in the m atter are peculiarly well 
served as they have available Jav ier O rtiz de la T ab la ’s Comercio 
exterior de Veracruz, 1788 -1821 : crisis de dependencia. * T hat work 
provides both a general outline and most particulars of the subject in the 
form  of a succesful narrative account. Thanks to it, our understanding 
is soundly based. T he facts being well established, however, we can now 
aspire to go beyond the political events themselves and study the hidden 
dynamics of policy formation.
In what follows, I contend that policy towards the port of Veracruz 
was shaped by the divergent economic interests of three non -  Mexi­
can cities: M adrid, Cádiz and H avana. M y objectives are firstly, to 
define the nature of H avana’s problems, and point to V eracruz’s 
potential role in solving them; secondly, to give an overview of late 
eighteenth century commercial policy form ation, and indicate that it was 
characterized by an attem pt to reconcile the needs of central and coastal 
Spain; and thirdly, to provide a new analysis of H avana -  V eracruz trade 
in the closing years of the colonial era, an analysis based on the inter­
play of the three centers indicated. T he central thrust of the argum ent is 
that contradictions inherent to imperial financial and commercial policy 
were brought to the fore by prolonged w arfare, and that the inevitable 
consequence was a growing incoherence between the two elements, an 
incoherence conducive to English and American economic penetration.
I.
H avana’s penetration of the V eracruz market was a  contentious issue 
during all of Charles IV ’s reign. T he C uban port’s ambition has been 
rightly seen as the natural result of economic growth. T hus Ortiz de la
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T abla notes:
La libertad  de com ercio de 1765 acrecen tó  el trá fico  m arítim o de la isla; la 
g u erra  de independenc ia  de las T rece  C olonias lo aum en tó  a ú n  m ás; la 
rebelión  n eg ra  de S an to  D om ingo en  1791, la  creación  de la  Sociedad 
Económ ica de A m igos del País de la  H a b a n a  en  1793 y la  del C onsu lado  en 
1794, las m ejoras técnicas y los g randes capitales invertidos en  la  ag ricu ltu ra  
fu e ro n  las causas princ ipa les del auge  económ ico cubano , cuya eclosión 
com ercial d a ría  como resu ltado  el in ten to  de g an ar el m ercado v e ra c ru za n o .. .2
T he crucial link between development of export -  oriented agriculture 
and demands for commercial intercourse with Mexico was coinage. To 
pay for slaves, machinery, packing supplies, and foodstuff C uba needed 
a constant inflow of foreign earnings and outside capital. In addition, the 
highly commercialized agriculture of the island required an adequate 
supply of circulating m edium .3
As is well known, colonies which specialized in agricultural exports 
always had difficulties keeping enough coinage in circulation. T his latter 
phenomenon accounts for Anglo -  American experiments with paper 
currency, the French W est Indies practice of accepting coins by tale and 
not weight, and the debased plata macuquina  of the Spanish Indies. In 
C uba, however, as its metropole would not allow it a legal "provincial” 
coinage, the problems of media of internal and external exchange tended 
to be one and the same. Further, given the pro -  species bias of Spanish 
monetary police, it seemed to C ubans that the only viable solution was 
to find some means of keeping Mexican silver pesos flowing smoothly 
through the island’s economy.
H avana was by fa r the most im portant C uban port. Its customs 
receipts and trade balances can be used to characterize the colony’s 
overall experience with overseas commerce in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries. W hat such data reveals is that the ebb and 
flow of this trade was highly responsive to the stimulation of reform  and 
war, and that the island was wont to suffer from  a balance of trade 
deficit.
The form er point is easily demonstrated by the 1765 -  1804 receipts 
of the H avana customs houses (see Table I). T he years of peace which 
followed the 1765 proclamation of comercio libre (with its reduced tax 
rates), saw a steady increase in average yearly government revenues 
from this source. This phenomenon, of course, was but a reflection of 
the dram atic rise in the volume of sea -  borne trade. T he most dynamic
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performances, however, were turned in years of revolution and war. 
Spanish participation in the W ar of American Independence boosted 
revenues and trade to unprecedented levels. These soon subsided to lower 
values, albeit they rem ained above those of p r e - w a r  years. T he time 
of troubles unleashed by the onset of the French Revolution, however, 
allowed C uban commerce to resume its vibrant growth. T he crisis in 
Saint Domingue stimulated C uban production and drove customs receipts 
upwards to the levels previously reached during the American war. This 
rise in trade and revenue continued, although at a slower tem po, during 
Spain’s w ar against revolutionary France (1 7 9 3 - 1795). T he most 
impressive growth, however, came with the start of Charles IV ’s w ar 
with G reat Britain (1 7 9 6 - 1802), after which revenue volumes subsided 
once again, although at a higher plateau than heretofore. And in all of 
this, trade deficits were endemic, even in peacetime.
TABLE I: Demonstración de los rendimientos efectivos que ha produ­
cido la administración general de rentas de m ar (de la 
Habana) ... desde 1765 ... hasta 1804, inclusive (en pesos 
fuertes).
Years T otals Y early A verages
1 7 6 5 -  1769 1,510,477 302,095
1770 -  1774 1,708,536 341,707
1775 -  1779 2 ,130,124 426,024
1 7 8 0 -  1784 3 ,330,433 666,086
1785 -  1789 2,485,730 497,146
1 7 9 0 -  1792 2 ,012,837 670,946
1793 -  1797 3,738 ,617 747,723
1 7 9 8 -  1801 6 ,839,840 1,367,968
1 8 0 2 -  1804 2 ,441,587 813,862
Source: A G I, S an to  D om ingo , leg. 1686.
As rising customs receipts resulted from higher volumes of trade, so 
were the latter a reflection of increased production of such goods as 
sugar and tobacco. Increased production of tropical goods, however, 
could only be achieved through substantial investments in machinery, 
works and, most particularly, slaves. T he rhythm  of C uban im porta­
tion of blacks, boosted by the proclamation of comercio libre de negros 
in 1789, is a significant indicator of this investment (see T able II). As is 
obvious, although trade in general responded positively to wartime
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conditions, the slave trade reacted negatively. This is perhaps because 
slave ships were more restricted as to sources of supply and sailing 
routes, and thus far less able to respond then other vessels to the hazards 
of war. In  any event, m ajor investments in m anpower took place in 
peacetime. These soaked up profits and savings, leaving H avana rela­
tively naked in the face of the immense balance of trade deficit which 
came with any w ar time boom in commerce.
TABLE II: Slave Arrivals in Cuba, According to A lexander von 
H um boldt, 1 7 9 0 -1 8 0 7
Y ear N u m b e r of Slaves Y ear N u m b er o f Slaves
1790 2,534 1799 4,919
1791 8,498 1800 4,145
1792 8,528 1801 1,659
1793 3,777 1802 13,832
1794 4,164 1803 9,671
1795 5,832 1804 8,923
1796 5,711 1805 4,999
1797 4,452 1806 4,395
1798 2,001 1807 2,565
Source: A lexander von H u m b o ld t, Ensayo político sobre la isla de Cuba (H a b a n a ,
1960), p p .2 0 5 -2 0 6 ;  as found  in  H e rb e rt S. K le in , The M iddle Passage 
(P rinceton , 1978), p .214.
T he year 1805 may be taken as characteristic of the perform ance of 
C uban external trade under w ar conditions (see T able III). As may be 
seen, C uba suffered from  an extraordinary deficit situation. Foreigners, 
and particularly North Americans, greatly profitted from  a situation 
where they were able to send to C uba twice the value of the goods which 
they received in return. T his produced a net outflow of coins from  the 
island, which helped to pay for the United States’ trade deficits but 
produced a shortage of coinage in C u b a .’*
C u b a’s m onetary problems were not inherently different from  those 
of other colonies whose economy was based on expon -  oriented agri­
culture. Elsewhere I studied the case of V enezuela.5 T here, the same 
difficulties arose, although complicated by the C row n's expon of treasury 
surpluses (in the form  of specie) towards the peninsula. T rade with
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V eracruz and with foreign colonies helped somewhat to replenish 
C aracas’ coinage supplies, albeit inadequately by the late eighteenth 
century. In Venezuela, the essential challenge was to find some means of 
reconciling the state’s thirst for funds with the economy’s need for a 
circulating medium. T hat challenge was tem porarily met thanks to 
ingenious bills of exchange transactions. Until the C row n’s fiscal 
problems becam e all -  consuming, a coalition of business interests was 
able to work out reasonable compromises with reform  -  minded admin­
istrators, arrangem ents which allowed the colony to enjoy an adequate 
circulating medium.
TABLE III: Balance o f  Trade for Havana, 1805 (in Pesos Fuertes)
Im ports Exports T o tal B alance
M etropo litan  Spain  
S pan ish  C olonies 
F o reign  Ports
515,204
723,868
10,541,138
34,037 
620,508 
4, 452,472
549,241
1 ,344,376
14,993,610
481,167
103,360
6 ,088 ,666
11,780,210 5, 107,017 16,887,227 6,673 ,193
Source: A G I, S an to  D om ingo , leg. 1687.
Some of the solutions adopted for C aracas were also applicable to 
H avana. As it did on various occasions in Venezuela, the Crown strove 
to take out its C uban profits in kind -  in this case, in tobacco. T here is 
also evidence that the eastern end of the island shipped cattle to French 
Saint Domingue, and V eracruz was a significant trading partner. For 
both Venezuela and C uba, however, V eracruz was an open port only for 
ships carrying colonial products.® N either was to be allowed to become 
an entrepot for European goods destined for the M exican m arket. How 
then was C uba to obtain or retain needed specie? As noted, H avana, like 
Venezuela was granted limited access to foreign colonies (and to the 
U nited States, which continued to be treated like a foreign colony), and 
officials promoted the export to Mexico of one of its natural products (in 
this case, wax). In fact, the government went so fa r as to encourage the 
island to im port silver from  places other than V eracruz.^ Despite such 
palliatives, however, the C row n’s true solution was entirely different, but 
quite direct. Indeed, one of the most striking features of the C uban 
economy in these years was the continuous inflow of Mexican funds to
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pay for the expenses of the plaza, apostadero, fortification program m e, 
arm y and navy units tem porarily stationed in H avana, and other official 
activities. T o this one must add monies destined for the United States 
and situados for outlying G ulf and C aribbean locations, funds which 
were routed through H avana but not always sent onward in the form of 
cash. H avana may have wished to earn its specie through trade. 
G overnment silver, however, was undoubtedly of some consolation and 
served to reduce the p o rt’s need for full access to the V eracruz m a r­
ket.
T he problem with this solution, of course, was that it placed H avana 
at the very nexus of the inner contradiction which threatened, in time of 
w ar, to vitiate the central thrust of the Bourbon reformist effort: the 
belief that both trade and treasure could be obtained from  the colonies. 
To grasp this fact, however, one must first examine the nature of the 
peninsular interests served by the reforms of Charles III and C h ar­
les IV.
II.
As I have had occasion to argue, two distinct coalitions of interests 
dominated colonial policy -  making in the late eighteenth century: the 
C ourt and peninsular cadres on the one hand, the entrepreneurial elites 
of Cádiz and the Spanish coast on the o ther.8 T he C ourt had an innate 
thirst for treasure shipments, the coast an inherent need for trade. In the 
time of Charles III (1759 -  1788), fiscal and economic reforms 
combined to satisfy both groups. T he existing literature, however, tends 
to take the C row n’s need for specie for granted, but to closely scrutinize 
its novel economic policies. In  consequence, the reform s which touched 
the interests of Cádiz and the coast are well understood. Those that 
relate directly to the fiscal interests of M adrid rem ain obscure.
For Cádiz and coastal Spain, the principal thrust of colonial policy 
had to be the development of the Indies trade. Ultimately, policy makers 
were to favour economic growth in the Spanish periphery: stimulating 
metropolitan productive and finishing operations by opening American 
markets; lowering peninsular costs and increasing re -  export volume by 
boosting the output of colonial mining, ranching and agriculture; and, 
lastly, keeping at home the profits of trade and transport.
As is well known, of course, monopolists of the Consulado of Cádiz, 
the middlemen between European m anufacturers and Spanish American 
consumers, fought reform tènaciously. It must be understood, however,
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that their loss was not necessarily that of their city. T rade reforms did 
not cripple Cádiz, which continued to dominate colonial trade.® In part, 
this was due to the moderation of Charles III who saw to it that 
comercio libre was imposed only gradually. From 1765 to 1777 the new 
policy was applied only in C aribbean zones marginal to the Cádiz trade. 
O ther areas remained subject to the traditional register ships (navios de 
registró) and convoys (flotas) .10 T herafter, more homogenous laws were 
enacted, but the crucial V eracruz market was still exempted from  the 
general regulation of 1778.** Special tonnage restrictions preserved some 
of the existing guarantees up to 1789. Lastly, even after the removal of 
quantitative limitations, exceptional rules regarding the V eracruz 
inter -  colonial trade continued to restrict competition.*^ Overall, it must 
be granted that Cádiz m erchants were given ample time to adjust to 
trade reform. By the start of the reign of Charles IV , therefore, coastal 
Spain was united in defense of its exclusive access to colonial ports. T he 
C ourt’s concern with patriation of specie was, for the coast, a source of 
mixed feelings; for although it kept the state solvent at the expense of 
someone else, it also caused unease as the source of these surpluses was 
often monopolized items of trade.
T he param ount aims of the C ourt were the security of the state and 
the extension of its services. T o meet these objectives a healthy level of 
Crown revenues was imperative, but none was prepared to sacrifice Old 
Regime privileges to fiscal needs. T he obvious solution was to obtain 
external funds: colonial treasure and taxes on the Indies trade. The 
Crown understood, of course, that efficient administration was more 
likely to be effective than predatory policies. T hus, a compromise 
between bureaucratic and business objectives could be achieved. The 
difficulty, however, was that behind the concerns of the C ourt lay the 
interests of M adrid and much of central Spain. Indeed, a dispropor­
tionate share of state income was spent in the capital, and that expend­
iture in turn generated a significant proportion of economic activities in 
central Spain .13 This situation ensured that, in times of trouble, when 
difficult choices had to be made between trade and treasury, the struggle 
over Crown policiy would be between central and peripheral Spain, 
between two different modes of economic life.
As I have already shown elsewhere, during the reign of Charles IV , 
the Crown was increasingly driven to sacrifice its economic goals to its 
financial ones.*“* This was no free choice, of course. It resulted from a 
fiscal situation which had been steadily worsening ever since the W ar of 
American Independence.*3 In any event, sacrifice of ’’economic” to
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’’financial” goals really m eant the sacrifice of the coast to M adrid ’s 
awesome need for government expenditure. Indeed, for a  command 
economy such as that of central Spain, government solvency was the 
very lifeblood of agriculture, trade and manufacturing.
III.
W hat does this type of analysis reveal about the evolution of policy 
towards H avana -  V eracruz trade? I believe that, here again, one sees 
the gradual dissolution of the entente which made the reforms of Charles 
III possible. As long as that entente was in place, and to the degree 
possible, H avana had to be denied access to Veracruz. As the entente 
broke down, however, and as the Crown became more intent upon the 
objective of patriating American funds, C ádiz’s dem and that H avana not 
become an entrepot became less and less compelling. Further, as the 
government became serious about monopolizing treasure for M adrid, it 
had to try to cut C u b a’s links with the M exican treasury. T his, of 
course, would have deepened H avana’s coinage problems, unless com­
pensation was offered in the form  of broadened access to V eracruz.
T he chronology is suggestive. T he years following the death of 
Charles III saw the completion of the reform  process.16 A Real Decreto 
of February 28, 1789 removed all tonnage restriction on M exican and 
Venezuelan trade, allowed half of the goods carried to be foreign and 
reduced duties by 10 percent for ships carrying only national products. 
T he order signified the extension of comerco libre to Mexico and 
V enezuela. O n the other hand a Real Ordenanza  of August 16, 1790 
forbade trans -  shipping of European products to V eracruz via H avana, 
and another of M arch 12, 1791 insisted that, unlike other ships of 
comercio libre, those going to V eracruz might not make stopovers in 
other colonial ports (those of Venezuela excepted). Cádiz objected to all 
such interm ediate stops, but was given satisfaction only as regards the 
M exican p o rt.17 W hat the Crown was indicating by these m easures was 
that it was not prepared to treat V eracruz and H avana entirely in the 
same way as other ports. The trade of V eracruz was too valuable, 
H avana too well -  placed to underm ine mercantilist expectations. In 
short, the growth of H avana as a colonial center could not, in the 
governm ent’s view, be based on the role of the entrepôt. It had to be 
founded on its traditional military function and on its growing vocation 
as a sugar center. This latter possibility, in fact, particularly appealed to 
the men in command in M adrid, who showered the island and other
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C aribbean regions with beneficial legislation. Foreign iron machinery was 
allowed to enter duty free, the rules for the black slave trade were 
liberalized, and the commerce of the puertos menores largely freed of 
fiscal obstacles. Most significantly, at the behest of C uban lobbyist 
Francisco de Arango y Parreño, H avana was conceded special liberties 
for its trade in cotton, coffee, indigo, sugar, aguardiente and slaves, the 
decisions being taken in full Council of State, with the King presiding.18
Despite such a favorable predisposition, with the start of w ar with 
France in 1793 another set of Crown reservations about H avana began 
to come to the fore -  the fear that C uba was going to absorb funds 
needed in the peninsula. In  a secret order the Viceroy of New Spain was 
instructed to be careful about sending money to C uba to sustain its 
naval forces, as this should be done ”con la mayor economía por ser las 
atenciones de Europa mas urgente.”1® Similarly, fearful that H avana 
would retain funds found aboard Spanish bound warships which stopped 
in C uban waters, M adrid ordered the intendant ’’que con ningún motivo 
no pretexto detenga los caudales que lleguen a aquel puerto.’’^  The 
Viceroy of New Spain Count of Revillagigedo, however, had already 
foreseen the new circumstances. Sending the frigate ’’M inerva” to Spain 
with cash, he gave its captain very clear orders:
prevengo a  V m d. con la  m ayor estrechez que  es posible evite el llegar a  la 
H a b a n a  con m otivo de reponer ag u a , . ..  pero en  caso de que  esto no  pueda 
verificarse no  se d e ten d rá  en  aquel pu erto  m as que el tiem po preciso para  
e jecu tarlo ; adv irtiendo  a  V m d. que  a u n  en  el caso de rec ib ir a lg u n a  o rden  del 
s eñ o r com andan te  general (de m a rin a ) de aquel puerto  p a ra  e n tra r  y 
p e rm an ece r en  el, con tinue  sin  em bargo  su v iaje a  E s p a ñ a .21
T he C uban authorities, however, held a junta  de generales when the 
’’M inerva” came into port, quashed the viceregal orders, and took off the 
3,000,000 pesos fuertes which the ship carried. Despite concerns over 
having to share funds with H avana, however, M adrid continued to grant 
ever more extensive commercial privileges to the port city.'111
As these developments were taking place, the growth of C uban ties to 
the U .S. market made H avana’s trade with Mexico all the more 
problematical. In part, the development of such ties was due to the 
Spanish government itself, which ordered its diplomatic agents to ship 
foodstuffs on American ships to its various C aribbean bases, although 
the initiative shown by local officials in interpreting royal orders was 
more generally to blame. W ith peace all such contacts were banned by 
R .O . of January  21, 1796. O n O ctober 6, 1796, however, Spain
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embarked on the first of two consecutive wars with G reat Britain. The 
Spanish defeat at the Battle of Cape St. Vincent (February 14, 1797) 
guaranteed the effectiveness of the British blockade and H avana soon 
was thrown open to neutral ships, by local action, long before the Crown 
agreed to the neutral flag trade as a general principle. In fact, of 
course, the Consulado of H avana asked for this wartime m easure in 
Septem ber of 1796, the month before w ar was d ec la red .^  At about the 
same time, H avana interests resumed their pressure for full access to the 
V eracruz market. Both of these phenom ena have been well documented 
and need not be reviewed here. It is essential to understand, however, 
that the two are causally related. Indeed, as indicated above, as the 
receipts of H avana customs indicate, the p o rt’s trade boomed in wartime 
along with the exports of the island’s agriculture. W ith greater economic 
activity came a heightened need for circulating medium. Access to 
V eracruz became ever more im portant, particularly as the heretofore 
dependable M exican situado became increasingly sporadic.
As we know, M adrid resisted H avana’s pressure all through the first 
British war. W ith the coming of peace, however, the situation did not 
return to norm al for the Crown was not prepared to resume its generous 
support, from  M exican sources, of the C uban treasury. As the Inten­
dant of H avana was informed by M inister of Finances M iguel Cayetano 
Soler:
Y a es tiem po que aquella  isla ta n  fé rtil trib u te  lo necesario  p a ra  subsistir sin 
necesidad de situado, sino que lo proporcione a  los parages contiguos y deje 
sobrantes capaces de com pensar a  la  m etrópo li.24
As Soler’s commercial policy was based on a  return to full m ercanti- 
listic rigor, of course, the H avana treasury was hardly likely to measure 
up to his expectations.
W ith the resumption of w ar with G reat Britain in late 1804, H avana 
faced difficulties once more which could best be resolved by M exican 
silver. By April of 1806 C uban interests were able to induce officials of 
the ministry of finance to prepare orders opening V eracruz to the 
Habaneros. Miguel Cayetano Soler refused to sign them , how ever.^  
T he deadlock was only broken when interim Intendant R afael Gomez 
Roubaud complained in August 1806 directly to Godoy, the steadfast 
champion of C uban interests, who supported the in tendant’s request for 
H avana -  V eracruz t r a d e . I t  is significant that the intendant’s petition 
was exclusively directed at solving H avana’s balance of trade deficit. 
Gomez R oubaud, with the trade statistics of 1805 in hand, pointed p a r­
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ticularly to the 6,088,666 pesos fuertes of deficit with foreign ports (see 
Table III). H e insisted that only access to V eracruz would bring silver 
back into H avana, a city in which the ordinary circulating medium seems 
to have become Portuguese gold coins -  a most peculiar circumstance 
for a Spanish colony. It is a dossier started with this letter that produced 
the R .O . of M ay 10, 1807, allowing the r e - e x p o r t  from  H avana to 
V eracruz of European goods. ^
In conclusion, what is one to make of the affair? I believe that the 
Bourbon reform er’s policy towards the port of V eracruz was designed to 
boost the economy of coastal Spain even as it was meant to safeguard 
the flow of funds on which that of the M adrid region was based. This 
double -  edged policy limited the economic growth of C uba, as it did not 
allow an adequate flow of coinage to the island. As the interests of 
C entral Spain slowly gained primacy, however, those of Cádiz and the 
coast could then be sacrificed. T he mom ent of truth was delayed by 
ideologues such as Soler, but by 1807 there was no longer any reason to 
prevent H avana from serving as an A n g lo -A m erican  conduit to Mexi­
co. T he commercial policy characteristic of the Bourbon Reform s was no 
more.
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